Security and access control

TAG is designed so your secret keys never leave your hands. This page explains how authentication, authorization, and credential handling work under the hood.

Setting up credentials

TAG needs two sets of credentials to operate:

Client credentials

Your application clients use their own Tigris credentials, signing requests with standard AWS SigV4. No changes are needed on the client side beyond pointing the endpoint URL at TAG. TAG never sees or stores client secret keys.

TAG's own credentials

Your application must provide TAG with its own Tigris credentials via environment variables. These credentials must have read-only access to all buckets that clients will access through TAG:

export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<TAG's access key>
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<TAG's secret key>

Both TAG's access key and client access keys must belong to the same Tigris organization.

Authentication

TAG operates in transparent proxy mode by default. In this mode, TAG forwards the client's original Authorization header to Tigris unchanged and adds cryptographically signed proxy headers (X-Tigris-Forwarded-Host, X-Tigris-Proxy-Access-Key, X-Tigris-Proxy-Timestamp, X-Tigris-Proxy-Signature) computed with TAG's own secret key. Tigris independently validates both the client's SigV4 signature and TAG's proxy signature in a single round-trip.

TAG never sees client secret keys, client credentials do not need to be stored anywhere other than on the client, and Tigris retains full control over authorization decisions.

Local authentication

TAG doesn't call Tigris on every request. After your client's first request, TAG learns enough to validate signatures locally — so cache hits skip the network entirely.

How it works

On the first request, TAG learns your client's derived signing keys from Tigris. Every request after that is validated locally:

First request (key learning):

Subsequent requests (local validation):

Access control flow

Here's the full decision tree TAG uses when a request arrives. Most paths end with a forward to Tigris — TAG only serves from cache when it has both a valid signature and a cached authorization grant:

Authorization lifecycle

Authorization decisions are cached per (accessKey, bucket) pair:

Event	Action
Tigris returns 2xx with signing keys	AuthzCache.Grant(accessKey, bucket)
Tigris returns 403	AuthzCache.Revoke(accessKey, bucket)
TTL expires (10 min default)	Entry removed, next request re-authorizes

Authorization is strictly per-bucket. A client may have access to some buckets but not others, and TAG enforces this at the cache level.

Proxy header security

Preventing client injection

TAG overwrites any client-supplied proxy header values with TAG's own computed values. Clients cannot impersonate TAG or bypass proxy authentication.

Proxy signature computation

TAG computes the proxy signature using its own secret key. Only TAG (and Tigris, which knows TAG's key) can produce a valid proxy signature.

Endpoint validation

TAG validates the upstream endpoint at startup to prevent misconfiguration and SSRF attacks.

Allowed hosts:

Pattern	Example	Use case
localhost	http://localhost:8080	Development and testing
*.storage.dev	https://t3.storage.dev	Tigris storage domains

Any other endpoint causes a fatal startup error.

Error mapping

Auth error	S3 error code	HTTP status	Action
Signature mismatch	SignatureDoesNotMatch	403	Forward to Tigris
Unknown access key	InvalidAccessKeyId	403	Forward to Tigris
Expired request	RequestTimeTooSkewed	403	Forward to Tigris
Malformed auth	MalformedAuth	400	Reject at TAG
Missing auth	(none)	(none)	Forward to Tigris